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ABORTION, EQUALITY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
Gillian E. Metzger1
Abortion and equality are a common pairing; courts as well as legal scholars
have noted the importance of abortion and a woman’s ability to control whether and
when she has children to her ability to participate fully and equally in society. 
Abortion and administrative regulation, on the other hand, are a more unusual
combination.  Most restrictions on abortion are legislatively imposed, while
guarantees of reproductive freedom are constitutionally-derived, so administrative
law does not frequently figure in debates about access to abortion.  
I think administrative regulation of abortion merits closer study.  Fights over
reproductive rights are increasingly occurring in administrative contexts.  The
current struggle over the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s refusal to
grant over-the-counter access to emergency contraception is a prime example, with
recent expansions in state licensing requirements for abortion clinics being another.
Such licensing requirements are often quite onerous, forcing clinics to undertake
costly renovations or imposing conditions that clinics are unable to meet.  Yet
instances also exist of administrative regulation being used affirmatively to foster
women’s reproductive rights, such as Illinois’ recent rule requiring pharmacists to
dispense emergency contraception if they dispense other forms of contraception.2 
 
This trend towards increasing administrative control is reason enough to pay
greater attention to the interaction of administrative law and reproductive rights. 
Perhaps more relevantly to this symposium, however, focusing on administrative
abortion regulation is useful because it demonstrates unexpected obstacles to
successfully challenging abortion restrictions as unconstitutional gender
discrimination.  Numerous grounds exist on which to conclude that measures
singling out abortion for regulation should constitute sex-based classifications for
purposes of equal protection analysis.  As Reva Siegal has argued, abortion
restrictions were and are often animated by traditional—and constitutionally
3 Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 277, 348–80 (1992); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and
Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1992); see also Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of
Motherhood 192–215 (1984) describing different views of motherhood and women’s roles that
dominate pro-life and pro-choice movements).
4Anita Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on
Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 419, 424–28, 435–39 (1994);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.
L. Rev. 375,382–83 (19850; Kenneth Karst, The Supreme Court—1976 Term, Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 57–59 (1977); Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 1016–19 (1984); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L. J. 1281, 1308–13, 1319–20 (1991).
5 Law, supra note ?, at 1016; see also Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich.
L. Rev. 1569, 1618–23, 1630–35 (1979) (describing the equal protection problem with an anti-
abortion statute as being that “[w]omen who want abortions are required to give aid in circumstances
where closely analogous potential samaritans are not.  And they are required to give aid of a kind and
an extent that is required of no other potential samaritan.”).  Congress accepted this reasoning in the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), which amended Title VII to grant protection against
employment discrimination based on pregnancy.  The PDA states that “‘because of sex’ or ‘on the
basis of sex’ include. . . because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k).
6 See Sunstein, supra note ?, at 32–33; see also Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979) (“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . . implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ not merely ‘in spite of’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.”).
7 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974).
illegitimate—views concerning women’s proper roles.3  In addition, the ability to
control their reproductive capacity is central to women becoming “full and equal
members of society.”4  But on the most basic level, abortion-specific regulation is
sex-based regulation because it exclusively targets women: “Only women become
pregnant; only women have abortions.”5  Further, as Cass Sunstein has argued, this
means that abortion regulations represent facial or de jure sex classifications, making
any additional demonstration of discriminatory purpose unnecessary.6
Of course, these arguments failed to persuade the Supreme Court, which in
its 1974 Geduldig v. Aiello decision insisted that not every pregnancy classification
was in fact sex-based.  In Geduldig the Court rejected a gender equal protection
challenge to a government disability program that denied benefits for disabilities
connected to pregnancy, famously concluding that the program did not distinguish
between men and women but instead between “pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons.”7  The Court has also upheld abortion-specific restrictions without seeming
to find it necessary to subject such measures to gender equal protection scrutiny.  Yet
more recently, the Court has indicated greater awareness of the relationship between
regulation of reproduction and sex discrimination.  Most notably, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey  invoked women’s equality concerns in concluding that access
8 See 505 U.S. 833, 852, 856 (1992).
9 See Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-31 (2003);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1996).  But see Nguyen v. United States, 533 U.S.
53, 61–70 (2001).
10 See sources cited supra notes 3–5.
11 See infra note ?.
to abortion should continue to receive constitutional protection under the Due
Process Clause.8   On other occasions, the Court has reinforced constitutional
prohibitions on sex-role stereotyping, as well as underscored how stereotypes based
on women’s roles as mothers and caregivers restrict their employment opportunities.9
These recent decisions might suggest the time has come to try to recast
abortion rights in equality terms, as many scholars have long argued.10  An additional
impetus is the diminished protection for abortion rights under due process that
resulted from Casey’s replacing the trimester framework of Roe v. Wade with the
undue burden standard.11  Moreover, administrative abortion measures might appear
particularly susceptible to gender equal protection challenge.  Administrative
regulation of abortion is overwhelmingly health regulation;  the focus is on abortion
as a medical procedure, and the government’s only stated interest is protecting the
health of women obtaining abortions—as opposed to that of preserving fetal life, the
other recognized government interest in this area.  This health focus is not
coincidental; administrative agencies typically play a major role in health regulatory
schemes, reflecting the medical, scientific, and technical expertise often involved.
But this focus means that the unique aspects of abortion—its impact on the fetus and
the social, moral, and psychological effects of terminating potential life—are largely
absent in regard to administrative abortion regulations.  Although abortion involves
women’s reproductive organs, that does not distinguish it under a health perspective.
Instead, the question is what risks and complications are associated with abortion
compared to other forms of surgery (or, in the case of medical abortion, compared
to other prescription drugs).   And widespread agreement on the minimal risks
associated with first and early second trimester abortions provides an objective basis
for concluding that regulations targeting such abortions represent instances where
medical procedures sought by women are being singled out for unwarranted burdens.
12 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Epstein v. Bd. of Regents, 65 N.E. 2d
756 (N.Y. 1946); Missouri ex rel Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926); Kemp v. Board of Medical
Supervisors, 46 App. D.C. 173 (D.C. Cir. 1917).
What this line of argument fails to account for, however, is the regulatory and
administrative character of abortion health measures.  Paradoxically, rather than
underscoring their gendered nature, emphasizing these measures’ health focus serves
to immunize them against constitutional challenge.  Doing so makes these measures
appear as a species of ordinary regulation, with the effect that courts assess their
constitutionality against the background of the government’s broad power to regulate
in the name of health as well as doctrines of deference to administrative expertise.
Framed in this fashion, regulations targeting abortion on health grounds become
simply a manifestation of the government’s leeway to regulate in a case-by-case
incrementalist fashion, instead of grounds for suspicion.  
The net result is that erasing abortion’s uniqueness to foster a gender equal
protection challenge serves actually to undermine the claim that it is illegitimate to
target abortion for regulation.  Put differently, the perception of abortion as unique
has a duel-edged character; it allows abortion to be singled out for regulation, but
also simultaneously singles out abortion for protection against regulation.  This
suggests that equal protection analysis is unlikely to offer greater prohibitions on
abortion targeting than are available under abortion-specific jurisprudence rooted in
due process.  More generally, while courts may come to recognize the importance
of reproductive rights to women’s equality, that recognition is more likely to come
by integrating equality concerns into current due process frameworks than by
independent equal protection challenges.
Yet at the same time, the perception of abortion health measures as ordinary
regulation opens up the possibility of challenging these measures in more
straightforward administrative law terms.  Administrative law does not offer the
permanent protections of constitutional law, and can be quite deferential to
administrative determinations.  Nonetheless, administrative law’s requirements of
explanation and reasoned decisionmaking may in the end offer the greatest protection
against regulations that single out abortion for disfavored treatment.
I.  RECENT INSTANCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ABORTION REGULATION: 
TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS AND 
FDA REGULATION OF ABORTION-RELATED DRUGS
 Administrative regulation of abortion is not a new phenomenon.  Although
triggering criminal penalties, abortion bans pre-Roe were also administratively
implemented, through license revocation proceedings for doctors who provided
abortions.12  Post-Roe, states and local governments imposed numerous requirements
on abortion in the name of protecting women’s health.  Many of these measures were
legislatively imposed; indeed, abortion and reproduction generally appear singular
in the extent to which the substantive details of health regulation are legislatively
13 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 900 (1992) (statutory reporting
requirements justified on health grounds); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 756–58 (1986) (same); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416, 431–39 (1983) (second-trimester hospitalization requirement imposed by city
ordinance); Mahoning Women’s Center v. Huner, 610 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1979) (detailed requirements
on abortion providers by city ordinance, including requirement that abortion facilities must be licensed
by the city Board of Health).
14 See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988) (invalidating Illinois
statutory and regulatory scheme imposing numerous requirements on abortion providers and facilities,
including requirement that abortions be performed in licensed surgical centers and the state
Department of Public Health hold public hearings on license applications); Birth Control Centers, Inc.
v. Reizen, 743 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding and invalidating parts of Michigan’s statutory and
regulatory scheme applicable to abortion clinics); Friendship Med. Ctr. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505
F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) (invalidating regulations adopted by city board of health addressing a
variety of aspects of abortion provision); Florida Women’s Med. Clinic v. Smith, 478 F. Supp. 233,
235–36 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (invalidating detailed implementing regulations but not statutory abortion-
specific licensure requirement as unconstitutional under Roe).
15 See supra cases cited nn.?–?; see also Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968 (1976) (sum. aff)
(invalidating pre-Roe requirement that first trimester abortions be performed by a physician in a
hospital or licensed health facility); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10–11 (1975) (per curiam)
(upholding prohibition on abortions by non-physicians because first trimester abortion only safe if
performed by competent personnel).
16 See Amalia W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion Providers:
A New Constitutional Strategy, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1563, 1565 (2005); see also
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-action-center/in_your_state/who-decides/nationwide-
trends/issues-trap.html (website of NARAL/Pro-Choice America providing links to different states’
TRAP laws).  Disagreement exists on the number of states which currently have TRAP laws.  See
determined, rather than left for administrative discretion.13  Nonetheless, in the post-
Roe period abortion providers were occasionally subjected to administrative
restrictions as well.14  Recently, however, abortion regulation justified on health
grounds—and even more specifically, abortion health regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies—seem to be growing more prevalent.  Two particular
instances of such administrative regulation deserve special note.  One is state and
local regulatory schemes imposing a variety of detailed requirements on abortion
providers and facilities; the other, federal regulation of drugs connected to abortion
and to reproduction more generally.  Some background on these two instances is
helpful for understanding the difficulties involved in challenging administrative
abortion regulation in equal protection terms. 
 
A. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers and Facilities
In the years between Roe and Casey, numerous jurisdictions adopted detailed
regulatory schemes subjecting abortion providers to a wide variety of requirements
not imposed on those performing comparable medical practices.15  Such targeted
regulation of abortion providers, often referred to by pro-choice advocates as TRAP
laws, has expanded significantly post-Casey.16  This expansion is not unique to
Jorns, supra, at 1568 & n.20.
17 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–76; Caitlin Borgmann, Winter Count:  Taking Stock of
Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 Fordham Urb. L. J. 675, 688 (2004); see also Gillian
E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2025 (1994) (analyzing implications of the undue burden standard
for challenges to abortion restrictions).   According to the organization NARAL/Pro-Choice America,
between 1995 and 2005 the states enacted 467 anti-choice measures.  See Key Findings, in Who
Decides: The Status of Women’s Reproductive Rights in America (15th ed. 2006), available at:
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/choice-action-center/in_your_state/who-decides/nationwide-tren
ds/key-findings-risk.html.  The expansion in TRAP laws in particular also reflects pro-life activists’
recognition that efforts to ban abortion outright would not succeed post-Casey.  This lead to “‘a shift
in strategy’” to focus on “‘regulation at the outskirts of abortion’” and efforts to “[c]ouch the issue in
terms of women’s health.” Barry Yeoman, The Quiet War on Abortion, Mother Jones, Sept. 1, 2001,
at 46 (quoting a staff counsel at Americans United for Life).
18 See Jorns, supra note ?, at 1568–69; Center for Reproductive Rights, Targeted Regulation
of  Abor t ion  Providers :  Avoid ing  the  “TRAP” 2–4  (Apr .  2004) ,  a t
http://www.crlp.org/pub_fac_trap.html (detailing typical TRAP requirements with illustrations from
different states’ regulatory codes).
19 Compare, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-302(a) (requiring abortion facilities be licensed and
inspected by the state health department and authorizing that department to promulgate regulations
addressing “facilities, equipment, procedures, techniques, and conditions” of such facilities) with Ark.
State Bd. of Health, Rules and Regulations for Abortion Facilities, §§1–12 (detailed regulations); S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 44-41-75 (imposing licensing requirement on facility performing more than five
abortions per month and requiring state health department to issue regulations on a variety of specific
subjects) with S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-12 (2005) (detailed regulations).
20 See, e.g., Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 598–601 (6th Cir.
2006) (describing clinic’s lengthy interactions with state department of health over license); Planned
Parenthood v. Atchinson, 126 F.3d 1042, 1044–45 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Founder’s Women’s Health
Ctr. v. Ohio State Dept’t of Health, Nos. 01AP-872, 01AP-873, 2002 WL 1933886 at *5, *7–*10
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2002) (upholding state hearing examiner’s conclusion that abortion providers
are subject to statutory licensure requirements).
TRAP laws; other forms of abortion restrictions have also increased, reflecting
Casey’s greater tolerance of such measures and that decision’s identification of the
government’s interests in potential life and women’s health as legitimate from the
beginning of pregnancy.17  
The content of different states’ TRAP laws varies, but in general they impose
licensing requirements, authorize state inspections, regulate wide-ranging aspects of
abortion providers’ operations—including, for example, staff qualifications and
minimum hallway dimensions—and  impose civil and criminal penalties for
noncompliance.18  Although the adoption of such abortion regulations is frequently
mandated by statute, the specific content of the resultant requirements (often quite
detailed) is set by state agencies.19  Moreover, the resultant regulatory schemes
themselves expand administrative oversight and control of abortion providers by
mandating periodic licensing and inspection of abortion facilities, which can lead to
frequent interaction with health department officials as well as adjudicatory hearings
or other administrative proceedings.20
21 General applicability and evenhandedness was frequently emphasized in decisions
sustaining regulations.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 487–90 (1983)
(upholding requirement that a pathologist review and report on tissue removed during abortions,
characterizing the requirement as in accord with generally accepted medical practice, as imposing a
“comparatively small additional cost,” and as applying to almost all surgeries); Simopoulos v,
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 511–19 (1983) (upholding requirement that second trimester abortions be
performed in licensed outpatient surgical facilities, where same regulatory requirements applied to all
such facilities, including those not performing abortions, and concluding no reason existed “to doubt
that an adequately equipped [abortion] clinic could, upon proper application, obtain an outpatient
hospital license”); Baird v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 599 F.2d 1098, 1101–02 (1st Cit. 1979)
(emphasizing that licensing requirement applied to all clinics in rejecting claim that applying
requirement to abortion clinic was unconstitutional); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1357–58
(8th Cir. 1976) (stating “a state can impose the same regulations on a[n abortion] clinic . . . that are
imposed on other clinics that person surgical procedures requiring approximately the same degree of
skill and care” in upholding state’s power to regulate first trimester abortions); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65–67 (1976) (upholding government’s power to require written
consent for abortion, arguing that states could impose a written consent requirement for any surgery,
although noting Missouri had done so only for abortion).
22 See Mahoning Women’s Center v. Huner, 610 F.2d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 1979) (emphasizing
abortion singled out for restrictive measures and that regulations would significantly burden
fundamental right), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 447 U.S. 918 (1980); Friendship Med.
Ctr. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1152–54 (7th Cir. 1974); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d
1349, 1351–52 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating St. Louis measure targeting abortion, emphasizing that
in “no other single surgical procedure . . . [are] doctors . . . required to 'prove up' their overall fitness
as they are here,” and concluding that the measure was unreasonable and penalized women seeking
abortion as well as their physicians); Hallmark Clinic v. North Car. Dep’t of Human Res., 380 F.
Supp. 1153, 1157–58 (E.D. N. Car. 1974) (three-judge court) (“Under Roe and Doe, if North Carolina
may regulate the performance of first trimester abortions at all, it may do so only to the extent that it
regulates tonsillectomies and other relatively minor operations.”); see also Reizen, 743 F.2d at 358–60
(emphasizing Michigan regulations applied to all freestanding surgical facilities and lack of evidence
of selective enforcement in rejecting equal protection claims).
23 See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1369–72, 1373–75 (rejecting licensing,
physical plant, staffing, and certificate of need requirements for ambulatory surgical facilities as
applied to facilities performing first trimester abortions, emphasizing burden of greater cost on access
to abortion as well as that desire to regulate abortion clinics motivated adoption of general regulatory
scheme); Reizen, 743 F.2d at 362–63, 364–66 (sustaining due process challenges to general
regulations found to result in significant cost increases but not to regulations found not to have a
significant impact).  Other decisions rejected challenges to generally applicable laws, such as licensing
requirements, but in doing so noted lack of evidence that the requirements imposed a burden. See, e.g.,
Baird, 599 F.2d at 1102–03.
Litigation challenging TRAP measures pre-Casey was often, though not
always, successful.  An important factor for judicial willingness to invalidate such
measures was whether abortion providers and facilities actually were singled out for
special treatment.21  But rather than invalidating regulations targeted at abortion on
gender equal protection grounds, courts instead largely emphasized the
constitutionally-protected status of abortion rights under due process.22  Indeed, in
some cases concern about burden on access to abortion led courts to uphold
constitutional challenges even where the regulatory schemes did not single out
abortion but instead applied more generally to all outpatient surgical facilities.23
24 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
25 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).  Other post-Casey federal decisions addressing laws targeting
abortion for health regulation include Women’s Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to licensing level of 300 abortions per year but affirming
preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs’ likely success on vagueness challenge); Springfield
Healthcare Center v. Nixon, No. 05-4296-CV-C-NLL (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16, 2005) (concluding
enforcement of Missouri requirement that abortion providers have clinical privileges at a hospital
within thirty miles likely to create an undue burden on abortion access and granting TRO), vacated,
No. 05-4296-CV-C-NKL (W.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2005); Jackson Women’s Health Org’n Inc. v. Amy,
330 F. Supp.2d 820 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (preliminarily enjoining requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed only in licensed surgical facilities or hospitals, when no surgical facility or
hospital in state provided second-trimester abortions except in rare circumstances and existing abortion
provider ineligible to become license under regulatory scheme); Reproductive Servs. v. Keating, 35
F.Supp.2d 1332 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (preliminarily enjoining second trimester requirement for
abortions); see also Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 372 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that by
its terms South Dakota statute did not require hospitalization for second-trimester abortions because
hospitals in South Dakota are not available to perform abortions and thus reversing district court
determination that second-trimester hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional).  In addition,
some state court decisions address TRAP measures.  See Tenn. Dep’t of Health v. Boyle, No. M2001-
01738-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002) (holding state statute requiring a private clinic
that performs a substantial number of abortions to obtain a certificate of need creates an undue burden
on abortion and also violated the right to privacy under the Tennessee Constitution); Founder’s
Women’s Health Ctr. v. Ohio State Dept’t of Health, Nos. 01AP-872, 01AP-873, 2002 WL 1933886
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2002) (interpreting licensing requirement for ambulatory surgical facilities
to apply to facilities primarily performing abortions and holding subjecting abortion providers to
licensure requirement did not create an undue burden); Davis v. Fieker, 952 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1997)
(holding evidence insufficient to show second trimester hospitalization requirement imposed an undue
burden and that Akron’s determination that such hospitalization requirements are unconstitutional was
no longer valid).
26 222 F.3d at 170; see also id. at 166-67 (arguing that Court has distinguished between
regulations that “reach into the heart” of protected liberty and those that “merely have an incidental
effect on the women’s decision, but noting the Court had invalidated even health regulations found
to impose a “prohibitive” cost increase).  The Fourth Circuit subsequently rejected additional
challenges to the regulations as violating due process (on standardless delegations and vagueness
grounds) the First Amendment, and informational privacy rights.  See Greenville Women’s Clinic v.
Commissioner, 317 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2002).
Few decisions exist, particularly at the federal appellate level, addressing the
constitutional challenges to TRAP measures post-Casey.  The two main decisions are
by the Fourth Circuit, in Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant,24 and by the Ninth
Circuit, in Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden.25  In Greenville Women’s Clinic, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the challenged regulations in their entirety, suggesting that the
undue burden standard did not even apply because the regulations did not strike
“directly at the ability to make a decision to have an abortion as distinct from the
financial cost of procuring an abortion.”26 In Tucson Woman’s Clinic, by contrast,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that even indirect imposition of costs conceivably could
27 379 F.3d at 541–43.  The Ninth Circuit further held that disclosure and warrantless search
provisions in the regulations violated the Fourth Amendment and patient’s informational privacy
rights, and that other provisions were unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 549–55.  For a discussion of the
Fourth Amendment issue, see Jorns, supra note ?.
28 The district court in Greenville Women’s Clinic, by contrast, did invalidate South
Carolina’s regulations on equal protection grounds, both because the regulations singled out and
burdened a fundamental right and because they were unreasonable.  66 F.Supp.2d 691, 739–43 (D.
S. Car. 1999); compare Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, No. CV 00-141-TUC-RCC, 2002 WL
32595282 *3–*5 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2002) (rejecting equal protection claims).
29 See Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 173–75; Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d
at 545–47.
30 222 F.3d at 173. 
31 Instead, they challenged the regulations’ singling out of abortion as an unconstitutional
targeting of fundamental rights, a claim the Fourth Circuit ruled it did not need to address having
determined that the regulations did not create an undue burden on abortion access.  See id. at 173.
32 Id. at 172–73.
33 379 F.3d at 544 (“The right to abortion is a fundamental constitutional right.”).
34 Id. at 544–45.
create an undue burden and remanded for a determination of whether Arizona’s
abortion regulations in fact did so.27  
The two opinions were united, however, in rejecting equal protection
challenges to the regulations.28  Both ruled physicians performing abortions were not
a suspect class and thus their being singled out for special regulation triggered only
rationality review, which both courts found satisfied.29  In Greenville Women’s
Clinic, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “the particular gravitas of the moral,
psychological, and familial aspects of the abortion decision” made abortion
“rationally distinct from other routine medical services.”30  The court never expressly
addressed whether regulations targeting abortion are gender classifications, not
surprising as the plaintiffs did not challenge the regulations on gender equal
protection grounds.31  Perhaps the most notable feature of the Fourth Circuit’s equal
protection analysis was its claim that post-Casey the right to choose abortion may no
longer qualify as a fundamental constitutional right.32  
While the Ninth Circuit in Tucson Woman’s Clinic rejected that extreme
view,33 it agreed that equal protection offered no additional safeguard for the abortion
right than that found in the due process undue burden inquiry.34  Most significantly,
the Ninth Circuit did address and seemed somewhat sympathetic to the claim that the
abortion regulations at issue represented unconstitutional gender discrimination.
Nonetheless, it ultimately rejected the argument, concluding that “even if laws
singling out abortion can be judicially recognized as not gender-neutral, where such
laws facially promote maternal health or fetal life, Casey replaces the intermediate
35 Id. at 549.
36 126 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (6th Cir. 1997).
37 See Women’s Medical Prof. Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.  2006), reversing 277
F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (permanently enjoining requirement that ambulatory surgical
facilities must have written transfer agreement with hospital as applied to abortion provider).  The
Court emphasized that the Director of Ohio’s Department of Health had granted waivers to abortion
clinics in the past, concluding from this that despite the deviations from standard procedures evidenced
regarding this clinic—including numerous communications between the Department’s chief counsel
and right-to-life groups—the Director did not act with an illegitimate purpose in denying the waiver
application.  See id. at 608–09.  The clinic’s application for a waiver triggered substantial public
opposition in part because it was the only provider of late second-trimester abortions in southern Ohio
and the corporation that operated the clinic was owned by Dr. Martin Haskell, a physician closely
associated with development of the dilation and extraction or “partial birth abortion” technique.
38 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75–79 (1976); Wynn v. Scott, 449
F. Supp. 1302, 1324–1326 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (three-judge court), app. dismissed on different grounds,
599 F.2d 193 (1979).  Some states also imposed two-physician requirements on post-viability
abortions.  See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482–86 (1983) (upholding such a
requirement).
scrutiny such a law would normally receive under the equal protection clause with
the undue burden standard.”35 
In addition to such targeted regulation of abortion, evidence exists of
generally-applicable health regulations, in particular licensing requirements, being
applied against abortion clinics in a discriminatory fashion.  In Planned Parenthood
of Iowa v. Atchinson, the Sixth Circuit held that Iowa’s effort to enforce its certificate
of need statute against a proposed abortion clinic was unconstitutional.  Central to
the court’s ruling was its determination that Iowa’s Department of Health had an
established practice of not requiring medical offices structured similarly to the
proposed clinic to obtain a certificate.   From this, however, the appellate court
concluded that the health officials were motivated by an illegitimate purpose to
impede abortions, not that they had violated equal protection.36  More recently, the
Sixth Circuit rejected the claim that requiring an abortion clinic to obtain a written
transfer agreement with a local hospital as a condition for a license was
unconstitutional as applied to an abortion clinic—notwithstanding that the state
health department had deviated from its usual procedures in reviewing and denying
the clinic’s waiver application, and that no hospital would enter such an agreement
with the clinic in question.37 
B. Federal Regulation of Abortion-Related Drugs 
Like TRAP laws, significant government regulation of abortion-related drugs
and procedures is largely a recent phenomenon.  Although in the years immediately
post-Roe some states restricted certain methods of abortion, in particular saline
amniocentesis,38 regulation of abortion procedures became far more prevalent in the
mid-1990s with widespread adoption of statutes prohibiting use of the dilation and
39 A paper outlining the D&X method brought the technique to the attention of the National
Right-to-Life Committee in early 1993, which began a national campaign to encourage states and the
federal government to adopt statutes banning the procedure.  See Debra Rosenberg, Chipping Away
at Roe, Newsweek, Mar. 17, 2003 at 40.  Currently, 31states have adopted partial birth abortion bans,
although nearly all of these are nonenforceable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), holding Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion ban unconstitutional.   See
Center for Reproductive Rights, Briefing Paper: So-Called “Partial Birth Abortion” Ban Legislation:
By State 1 (February 2004), available at:  http://www.crlp.org/pdf/pub_bp_pba_bystate.pdf.  The
Supreme Court will revisit the constitutionality of partial-birth abortion bans next Term, in the context
of ruling on challenges to the federal ban.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 126 S. Ct. 1314 (2006).
40 See, e.g., An Act Relating to Abortion, 1997 Neb. Laws LB 23, § 3 (describing act as an
expression of the will of the people of the State of Nebraska and the members of the Legislature to
provide protection for the life of the unborn child whenever possible”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§2919.15(A) § 2919.15 Note, Uncodified Law, (“The General Assembly declares that its intent in
enacting [partial-birth measure] is to prevent the unnecessary use of a specific procedure used in
performing an abortion. This intent is based on a state interest in preventing unnecessary cruelty to
the human fetus.”); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951–52 (2000) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (purpose of partial birth bans is to “chip away at the private choice shielded by Roe v.
Wade”).  Congress justified the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 on its interest in
promoting maternal health, as well as in “preserv[ing] the integrity of the medical profession,”
“promot[ing] respect for human life,” and “protecting the life of the partially-born child.” Pub. L.
108-105, § 2(14)(G)-(H), Nov. 5, 2003, 117 Stat. 1206, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531, Historical and
Statutory Notes. 
41 The combination of the two drugs is known as mifeprex, and is the form of RU-486
approved for use in the United States.
42 RU-486 is used in combination with misoprostol to ensure complete abortion.  See
Margaret Talbot, The Little White Bombshell, N.Y. Times Mag., July 11, 1999, at 39.  Medical
abortions are also performed using misoprostol and methotrexate, a cancer drug.  See id; see generally
James G. Kahn, The Efficacy of Medical Abortion: A Meta-Analysis, 61 Contraception 29, 36–38
(2000) (concluding that both methods are effective at terminating pregnancy up to 49 days gestation
and listing differences).
extraction (D&X) procedure, commonly known as partial birth abortion bans.39
These bans differ significantly from the type of abortion regulations that are the
focus here, however, in that they are legislatively adopted and intended to advance
the state’s interest in preserving life.40 
More relevant to consideration of administrative health regulation are the
FDA’s decisions regarding access to mifespristone, more popularly known as RU-
486, and the Plan B form of emergency contraception.  Although both are used to
prevent reproduction, RU-486 and emergency contraception differ significantly in
their operation.  RU-486 is effective at preventing implantation of a fertilized egg
and thus pregnancy, but it is also used for medical (i.e. nonsurgical) abortion at up
to forty-nine days gestation.  It is taken in combination with another drug,
misoprostol,41 and operates by interfering with the flow of progesterone to the uterus,
essentially resulting in a miscarriage.42  Plan B, by contrast, has no effect on an
embryo or fetus, nor—contrary to popular perception—does it appear to impede
implantation of a fertilized egg.  Instead, progestin-only emergency contraceptives
such as Plan B operate by impeding ovulation and in other ways making fertilization
43 Knowledge of the mechanisms by which different methods of emergency contraception
prevent pregnancy is incomplete, and difficulties in conducting research on implantation mean that
a post-fertility effect cannot be definitely excluded.  Nonetheless, studies so far only indicate pre-
fertilization effects from Plan B (and levonorgestrel generally).  By contrast, Preven, another form of
emergency contraception that involves a combination of estrogen and progestin, may have an effect
on implantation, although studies suggest it primarily acts to inhibit ovulation.  In addition, some
evidence suggests that RU-486 may have both pre-fertilization and post-fertilization effects.   See, e.g.,
Horacio B. Croxatto et al, Mechanisms of Action of Emergency Contraception, 68 Steroids 1095,
1095–98 (2003); K. Gemzell-Danielsson & L. Marions, Mechanisms of Action of Mifepristone and
Levonorgestrel When Used for Emergency Contraception, 10 Human Reprod. Update 341, 346
(2004); Lena Marions et al., Emergency Contraception with Mifepristone and Levonorgestrel:
Mechanism of Action, 100 Obstetrics & Gynecology 65, 70 (2002); Russell Shorto, Contra-
Contraception, N.Y.Times Mag., May 7, 2006, at 48.   The increasing evidence that at least the Plan
B form of emergency contraception has no effect post-fertilization supports some commentators’
suggestion that what is at stake in the fight over Plan B is opposition to contraception and non-
procreative sex as much as opposition to abortion.  See Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality,
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 24–25 (2005); Shorto, supra.
44 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(1), 321(p), 355.
45 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (setting out conditions for approval or denial of a new drug
application); 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (defining a "new drug" as a drug "not generally recognized among
experts ... as safe and effective for use").
46 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (setting out when drugs are available only by prescription).  Under
FDA regulations, the FDA will authorize a drug’s availability OTC if the FDA “finds such
requirements are not necessary for the protection of the public health by reason of the drug's toxicity
or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary
to its use, and . . . that the drug is safe and effective for use in self-medication as directed in proposed
labeling.”  21 C.F.R. § 310.20(b); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, No. GAO-06-109, Food
and Drug Administration: Decision Process to Deny Initial Application for Over-the-Counter
Marketing of the Emergency Contraceptive Drug Plan B Was Unusual at 7-11 (Nov. 2005), available
at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06109.pdf;  [hereinafter, GAO Report](describing OTC switch
process).
less likely if taken a short time after intercourse.43   RU-486 and Plan B also came
before the FDA in very different postures.  The FDA reviewed RU-486 pursuant to
its authority under the federal Food and Drug Act (FDCA) to approve new drugs; the
FDCA bans sale of any new drug absent such approval.44  In reviewing a new drug
application, the FDA is charged with determining if the product is safe and
effective.45  Plan B, by contrast, was already available by prescription, and the issue
before the FDA was whether it should be available over-the-counter (OTC) and thus
without a prescription.  Under governing statutory and regulatory provisions, drugs
that are safe for use without medical supervision are generally available OTC.46
 What RU-486 and Plan B have in common, however, is that both were very
controversial FDA decisions because of their connection (or perceived connection,
in the case of Plan B) to abortion.  A second similarity is that the FDA appears to
have deviated from its standard procedures in regard to both.  RU-486 was developed
in France in 1980 and approved for use there in 1988, but did not become available
47 For a description of RU-486's development and the controversy surrounding it in France,
see Steven Greenhouse, A New Pill, A Fierce Battle, N.Y.Times Mag., Feb. 12, 1989, at 23.
48 See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifestone Embroils the
FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 571, 575–79 (2001); Talbot, supra note ?, at 39.
49 See Noah, supra note ?, at 576–79; Benton v. Kessler, 799 F. Supp. 281, 284–86, 288-91
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing regulatory framework and granting preliminary injunction ordering return
of RU-486 seized by U.S. Customs, concluding that a substantial likelihood existed FDA violated the
Administrative Procedure Act in issuing import alert on RU-486); see also Benton v. Kessler, 505 U.S.
1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam) (declining to vacate stay of preliminary injunction on grounds that no
substantial likelihood of success existed).
50 See Noah, supra note ?, at 577–84.
51  See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with
the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a
patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”);
James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari,  FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths
and Misconceptions, 53 Food & Drug L.J. 71, 76–80 (1998).
52 See id, at 584–90; Planned Parenthood v. Taft, 444 F.3d 502, 505–06 (6th Cir. 2006).
in the United States until twelve years later.47  In the intervening period, the FDA’s
response to the drug varied considerably with shifts in presidential administration.48
 In 1989, under the first President Bush and in response to congressional pressure,
the FDA put RU-486 on an import alert list, which made it ineligible for the FDA’s
personal use exemption; that exemption allows individuals to import a three-month
supply of a nonapproved drug for personal use.49  Under President Clinton, by
contrast, the FDA strongly encouraged RU-486’s manufacturer to submit a new drug
approval application, which was a highly unusual action for the FDA to take.  The
manufacturer had resisted doing so for fear of a boycott of its other products, but
eventually such an application was filed by a nonprofit organization to which the
manufacturer donated its license, and approved by the FDA under special accelerated
review procedures.  These procedures, however, are intended for use in approving
new drugs used in treating serious or life-threatening illnesses, which pregnancy is
not, and thus were not clearly applicable to RU-486.50  
Finally, the FDA’s approval of RU-486 in September 2000 differed from its
standard approach in several ways, including an effort to require physicians to adhere
to the FDA’s approved regimen as to how RU-486 is prescribed and used.
Ordinarily, deviations from the approved regimen—known as “off-label” uses—are
permitted.51  Ultimately, the FDA did not mandate compliance with its approved
regimen, which advocates opposed because it required two physician visits, and
many providers use an alternative protocol that avoids a follow-up visit for oral
administration of misoprostol.52  Recently, however, some providers have switched
to an approach closer to the FDA protocol or stopped providing medical abortions
at all after several publicized deaths connected to the alternative regimen for RU-486
53 See Gardiner Harris, Some Doctors Voice Worry Over Abortion Pills’ Safety, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 1, 2006, at A11 [hereinafter Harris, Some Doctors]; Gardiner Harris, After 2 More Deaths,
Planned Parenthood Alters Method for Abortion Pill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2006, at A10.
54  On state measures, see Taft, 444 F.3d at 506 (describing Ohio’s statute); Center for
Reproductive Rights, Laws and Regulations Affecting Medical Abortion 3 (July 2003), available at:
http://reproductiverights.org/tools/print_page.jsp (last visited May 17, 2006) [hereinafter CRR,
Medical Abortions] (noting new state legislation to restrict medical abortion had been proposed in at
least 12 states in 2003); see also Hilary Guenther, The Development of the Undue Burden Standard
in Stenberg v. Carhart: Will Proposed RU-486 Legislation Survive, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 1021, 1041-43
(2002) (describing a proposed Oklahoma measure banning use of RU-486).  On federal measures, see
RU-486 Suspension and Review Act of 2005, H.R. 1079, S. 511, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005); see
also RU-486 Patient Health and Safety Act, H.R. 489, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (requiring the
FDA to impose additional restrictions on access to mifepristone).
55 The other form of emergency contraception is known as Preven.  Its production was
stopped in 2004.  See GAO Report, supra note ?, at 11 n.22; see also supra note 43.
56 See GAO Report, supra note ?, at 11-12 (noting prior off-label use of standard birth control
pills as emergency contraception).
57 See Citizen’s Petition on Behalf of the American Public Heath Association et al., available
at: http://www.crlp.org/pdf/EC_petition.pdf; Tummino v. Crawford, Complaint at ¶ 39, available at:
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/crt_012105_fdacomplaint.pdf.  The FDA eventually denied the citizen
petition on June  9, 2006, in the midst of discovery in the Tummino litigation.  See Letter from Randall
W. Lutter, Assoc. Comm’r for Policy & Planning, FDA, to Bonnie Scott Jones & Simon Heller (on
file with Emory Law Journal). 
58 See GAO Report, supra note ?, at 38–40 (Appendix II) (reproducing FDA’s not approvable
letter to Barr Labs); id. at 13-19 (describing FDA’s actions on Plan B); see also id. at 3 n. 8
(describing non-approvable letters as meaning additional data needed, whereas approvable letters
mean sufficient data exists but some concerns persist).
abortions.53  In addition, several states have enacted or proposed limits on off-label
uses of RU-486, and a proposal to ban its use is pending in Congress.54
Plan B was approved for prescription use in 1999; another form of emergency
contraception had been approved for prescription use the prior year.55  In truth, as
both of these drugs consist of standard oral contraceptives taken at high doses, they
were available even before these dates because of physicians’ ability to prescribe
approved drugs for off-label uses.56  In 2001, a group of women’s health and medical
associations submitted a citizen’s petition seeking to have Plan B and Preven
switched to OTC status, but the FDA delayed acting on the petition for over five
years.57  In 2003, the manufacturer of Plan B submitted an application seeking to
have Plan B switched to OTC status.  Two FDA advisory committees meeting jointly
voted 23 to 4 to approve the switch, and directors of the two FDA offices assigned
to review the application similarly recommended approval.  Nonetheless, the Acting
Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation Research issued a not-approvable
letter to Barr Laboratories, which had purchased the marketing rights to Plan B.58 
The FDA’s decision to reject the recommendations of both its advisory
committees and the directors and staff of the offices reviewing the application was
59 According to the GAO, in only one other case in the period 1994-2004 did the FDA’s
decision on an OTC switch application differ from the recommendation of the advisory committee,
and in that case the FDA granted approval where advisory committee had recommended denial.  In
addition, of the 67 OTC switch applications filed during this period (resulting in 98 action letters),
Plan B represented the only instance in which the letter was signed by the Director of the Center for
Drug Evaluation Research rather than by the directors of the FDA offices that reviewed the
application.  See id., at 5, 19–20, 29–30.
60  See id. at 22–29, 30–31; see also id. at 51–52 (letter from the director of the FDA’s Office
of New Drugs arguing that the FDA had not previously distinguished between women of childbearing
potential based on their age in assessing the safety and efficacy of contraceptives and suggesting that
concerns were rooted in “views and attitudes about the morality of adolescent sexual behavior” and
‘concerns about the role for parents”).
61 See id. at 20–22. 
62 See id. at 3 & n.11, see also FDA, Drug Approvals; Circumstances Under Which an Active
Ingredient May Be Simultaneously Marketed in Both a Prescription Drug Product and an Over-the-
Counter Drug product, 70 Fed. Reg. 52050 (2005).
63 The FDA’s initial issuing of an import alert on RU-486, however, was challenged,
ultimately unsuccessfully, in Benton v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084, 1085 (1992) (per curiam).  In addition,
litigation has been brought challenging state measures limiting off-label use of RU-486, see Planned
Parenthood v. Taft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (S.D. Ohio 2004), and a petition was filed in 2003 seeking
to have the FDA stop distribution of the drug, see CRR, Medical Abortions, supra note 48, at 3.
64 See Tummino v Crawford (filed January 21, 2005), available at:
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/crt_012105_fdacomplaint.pdf.  The District Court denied the FDA’s motions
to dismiss and allowed discovery to proceed, including depositions of top FDA personnel.  See
a deviation from its usual practice regarding OTC applications.59  The Government
Accountability Office (GAO), asked by members of Congress to investigate the
FDA’s decision, concluded the FDA’s treatment of the Plan B application was
“unusual” in other ways as well.  Most notably, the reason cited by the FDA—lack
of data on use of Plan B by younger adolescents and concern that its OTC
availability would encourage them to engage in unsafe sexual practices—was not one
the FDA had previously considered in approving products.60   The GAO also noted
evidence suggesting high-level FDA officials had reached a decision before the
FDA’s review was complete and were unusually involved in Plan B’s review.61   In
response to the FDA’s not-approvable letter, Barr Labs submitted a revised
application, seeking to have Plan B be switched to OTC status only for women 16
and older.  Rather than approving the revised application, in September 2005 the
FDA issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking addressing the question of
whether a drug can be approved for prescription and OTC access simultaneously for
different groups.62
The FDA’s decision approving RU-486, and the conditions imposed on its
use, were never subject to legal challenge.63   Its refusal to approve Plan B for OTC
status, however, has ended up in the courts.  In January 2005, a lawsuit was filed in
federal district court in New York, challenging the nonapproval decision on gender
equal protection, right to privacy, and administrative law grounds.64  In lieu of
Tummino v. von Eschenbach, No.CV-05-366, Transcript at 78–80, 91–92 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.  22, 2005)
(Korman, J.); Tummino v. von Eschenbach, No.CV-05-366, Order Denying Partial Reconsideration
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006) (Korman, J.).  In addition, a magistrate judge denied the FDA’s motion to
prevent depositions of FDA officials, concluding that “a strong preliminary showing of ‘bad faith’ or
improper behavior’ has been made.”  Tummino v. von Eschenbach, No. CV-05-366, Decision and
Order at 30-34 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2006) (Pohorelsky, M.J.).
65 See Center for Reproductive Rights, 2005 Mid-Year Legislative Summary at 6–7.
Numerous states have also proposed measures that would authorized pharmacists and others to refuse
to dispense plan B and other contraceptives.  See id. at 7–8.
66 But see RU-486 Patient Health and Safety Act, H.R. 489, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003)
(proposed measure representing federal regulation of abortion providers).
federal action, some states have enacted measures to provide mechanisms by which
pharmacists are authorized to dispense emergency contraception without a
prescription and in other ways expand access to Plan B.65 
II.  OBSTACLES TO EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ABORTION REGULATIONS 
These two examples demonstrate the diversity among measures in the
category I am labeling administrative abortion regulations, despite their shared focus
on women’s health.  Regulations targeting abortion providers and facilities are
promulgated at the state or local level, include a variety of substantive requirements,
and usually are adopted in response to legislation specifically mandating greater
regulation of abortion providers.66  Regulation of abortion-related drugs, by contrast,
generally occurs at the federal level, involves a single drug at a time with decisions
focused on a specific regulatory issue, and is undertaken pursuant to non-abortion-
specific federal legislation.  
Yet from the perspective of equal protection, both share several notable
features.  In particular, both represent instances in which the government acting
pursuant to a neutral interest, protecting health, has singled out drugs and procedures
used only by women for distinct and disfavored treatment.  As a result, both types
of regulation might appear particularly suitable for challenge as unconstitutional on
gender equality grounds.  In fact, however, their health focus and administrative
aspect obscures their character as sex-based classifications.  Moreover, substantial
obstacles also exist to other possible equal protection claims, such as that these
measures unconstitutionally single out fundamental rights for regulation or are
irrational.
A. The Power of Framing: Illegitimate Targeting or Justified One-Step-
At-A-Time Regulation?
At first glance, it might seem that abortion health regulations are particularly
vulnerable to equal protection challenges.  As Justice Jackson argued in Railway
Express v. People of New York, illegitimate targeting is the danger that equal
67 336 U.S. 106, 112–13 (1949).
68 See, e.g., cases cited supra in note ?.
69 Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (denying substantive due process
claim to assistance in committing suicide, emphasizing states’ legitimate concerns about abuse of
vulnerable individuals).  In a recent decision, the D.C. Circuit held that the FDA’s refusal to allow
access to investigational drugs violated substantive due process rights of terminally ill, mentally
competent patients when an investigational drug is potentially life-saving, no alternative government-
approved treatment options exist, and the FDA has deemed the drug sufficiently safe for expanded
human trials.  445 F.3d 470, 486 (D. C. Cir. 2006).  While the appellate court thus upheld a challenge
to generally applicable requirements on due process grounds, it emphasized the narrow terms of its
holding, see id. 478 & n.9, and argued that the FDA’s having determined that a drug is safe for
expanded human trials undermined the government’s claimed safety interest, see id. at 486.
70 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871–873, 878–79 (1992).
71 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (“Abortion
is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the
purposeful termination of a potential life.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 159 (1973) (“The pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy.  She carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, . . .The situation is
therefore inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or
marriage, or procreation, or education” with which previous liberty and privacy cases were
concerned).
protection guards against,67 and targeting is the essence of the complaint against
these measures.  To be sure, if burdensome enough, even generally applicable
regulations could significantly restrict access to abortion.68  But the claim that
abortion’s constitutionally protected status entitles it to special exemption from
generally applicable requirements is less intuitively powerful than the claim it should
not be singled out for special burdens.  Plausible claims of substantive due process
protection could be made regarding a wide variety of medical procedures, such as
organ transplants or experimental treatments.  That fact, in and of itself, is rarely
enough to prevent substantial governmental regulation, even all-out prohibitions,
provided the government’s protective interests are seen as legitimately implicated.69
Targeting of course is present in regard to most abortion regulation, and the
Court has countenanced such targeting by characterizing abortion as “unique.”70  Yet
what makes abortion unique in the Court’s eyes is not its medical aspect but its
impact on the fetus and on the state’s interest in potential life.  As Casey put it:
Abortion is a unique act.  It is an act fraught with
consequences for others: for the woman who must
live with the implications of her decision; for the
persons who perform and assist; for the spouse,
family and society which must confront the
knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures
some deem nothing short of an act of violence against
innocent human life;  and, depending on one’s beliefs,
for the life or potential life that is aborted.71
72 See, e.g., Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 536, 539–4, 546–47 & n.2; Greenville
Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 163, 166–69; GAO Report, supra note ?, at 38–39 (reproducing FDA
nonapprovable letter on Plan B, which states that Barr Labs had “not yet provided adequate data to
support a conclusion that Plan B can be used safely by young adolescent women for emergency
contraception without . . . professional supervision”).. 
73 See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 435–49 (1983) (striking
down hospitalization requirement for second trimester abortions based on safety gains from the
dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure and evidence demonstrating that second trimester D&E
abortions can be performed as safely in outpatient clinics as in hospitals); Greenville Women’s Clinic
v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 175-76 (4th Cir. 2000) (accepting that abortion involves “often relatively
simple medical procedures”); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F.Supp.2d 691, 717–18 (D.
S. Car. 1999) (finding that abortion is one of the safest surgical procedures that can be performed”);
see also David A. Grimes, Induced Abortion: An Overview for Internists, 140 Annals of Internal
Medicine 620, 623–24 (2004) (describing safety data on abortion).  More debate exists over the
psychological effects of abortion.  But see Grimes, supra note ?, at 624 (arguing data demonstrates
improved psychological health post-abortion).  The focus of these regulations, however, is on
protecting women’s physical health.  For example, although some TRAP measures address counseling,
for the most part they focus on qualifications of providers, ability to access hospitals were emergencies
to occur, practice protocols, supplies required to be on hand and the like—all of which are keyed to
protecting women’s physical health (and thus affect psychological health only derivatively).
74  See Women’s Health Ctr. of West Houston v. Archer, 159 F. Supp.2d 414, 461–62 (S.D.
Tex. 1999); Greenville, 66 F.Supp.2d at 704–05;, 712, 714, 718; Opening Br. of Plaintiffs-
Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 2003 WL 22670260 at *6–*15 (Feb.
20, 2003).
75 See Harris, Some Doctors, supra note ??Greenville, 66 F. Supp.2d at 718.
But these administrative regulations are not intended to further the state’s interest in
protecting fetal life.  Instead, they are justified solely as measures advancing the
state’s interest in protecting maternal health.72  
Viewed simply through a health lens, however, abortion is hardly unique.  At
least within the medical community, broad consensus exists that the physical risks
of first and many second trimester abortions are relatively minor.73  The most
common methods used, suction curettage and dilation and evacuation, are surgical
procedures comparable in risks and other aspects to many surgical procedures
performed in physician offices—procedures not similarly subject to special
regulations in the name of health.  These  include both gynecological and
nongynecological procedures, such as minor nose, mouth, and ear surgeries, drainage
of neck abscesses, liposuction, and endoscopy.74  So too with medical abortions;
despite the recent deaths of a few women who had undergone abortions using RU-
486 and misoprostol, the risks associated with medical abortion remain very low.75
As a result, if a gender equal protection perspective were ever going to be
successfully injected into abortion analysis, arguably it would be here, where
abortion is being regulated solely as a medical procedure and an objective
basis—professional practices and empirical data on health risks—exists for
discerning dissimilar treatment.   Viewed from the health perspective, abortion
becomes a type of procedure with regard to which men and women actually are
76 Such claims were made in Tucson Woman’s Clinic.  See Br. of Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-
Appellees, supra note ?, at *11, *13 n.8, *40–*44.
77 Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730-31 (2003)
9alterations and internal quotations omitted); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1996).
Some argue the Court has intensified its scrutiny of sex-based classifications, with the Court’s
insistence that sex-based classifications require an “extremely persuasive justification” making the
Court’s stated intermediate scrutiny standard more akin to strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S.
at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974).
79 See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 548–49 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven if
laws singling out abortion can be judicially recognized as not gender-neutral, where such laws facially
promote maternal health or fetal life, Casey replaces the intermediate scrutiny such a law would
normally receive with the undue burden standard.”).
similarly situated; although men will never have abortions, they frequently have
minor surgeries posing a similar degree and kind of medical danger.  Moreover,
claims that surgeries and drugs of particular relevance to men and of comparable
health risk, such as vasectomies or Viagra, are not subject to similar burdens,
reinforce the facially gender discriminatory character of such abortion regulation.76
So does the paternalistic aura of extensively regulating abortion—thereby
substantially increasing its costs and limiting its availability—in women’s own
interests.  And while the Court’s protection of access to abortion has weakened over
the years, its enforcement of constitutional prohibitions on gender discrimination has
remained strong; the Court consistently at least invokes intermediate scrutiny,
demanding that sex-based classifications  “serve important governmental objectives”
and be “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”77  
Yet courts do not seem drawn to gender equality arguments against abortion
health regulations.  This was true before Casey, when courts regularly invalidated
health regulations for unconstitutionally targeting abortion, but did so under the
fundamental rights prong of gender equal protection analysis.  It remains true today.
Rarely do courts discuss whether an abortion health regulation represents an
unconstitutional sex-based classification, let alone invalidate it on this ground; the
Ninth Circuit’s Tucson Woman’s Clinic decision is remarkable for expressly
considering gender equality in connection with abortion at all.  Why are the courts
not more receptive?
Obviously, one major reason is precedent.  In sustaining the benefits
exclusion for pregnancy at issue in Geduldig, the Court insisted that “[w]hile it is
true that only women can get pregnant it does not follow that every classification
concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.”78  Perhaps more importantly, the
Court’s increased tolerance for regulation of abortion, now sanctioning restrictions
on pre-viability abortions that do not rise to the level of an “undue burden,” seems
incompatible with subjecting abortion regulations to more searching scrutiny on
gender equal protection grounds.79  Nor has the Court shown much interest in
developing different analytic frameworks for assessing abortion regulation
80 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–78, 900–01 (analyzing health-based regulations as well
as fetal life regulations under the undue burden framework); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,
971–72 (1997) (analyzing physician-only requirement under undue burden test and concluding no
basis exists for inferring illegitimate purpose).
81 In addition, Geduldig’s refusal to treat pregnancy as a sex-based classification arose in the
context of a benefits program, and thus may not extend to contexts, such as abortion restrictions,
where pregnancy is singled out for regulatory burdens.  See Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 548.
Geduldig is even more distinguishable from instances involving regulation of female contraceptives,
such as the FDA’s decision on Plan B; not only are the women taking Plan B not yet pregnant, but the
possibility exists of contrasting this regulation with regulatory treatment of contraceptive methods
used by men.
82 538 U.S. 721, 730–31 (2003).  In addition, the Court has occasionally suggested
Geduldig’s rejection of pregnancy as a sex-based classification be viewed narrowly.  See Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676–77, nn. 12–13 (1983) (emphasizing
that the focus of Geduldig was on the reasonableness of the exclusion of pregnancy on cost grounds);
Turner v. Dep’t of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 45 n.* (1975)(per curiam)(rejecting analogy
to  Geduldig and invalidating statute making women ineligible for unemployment benefits for 18
weeks surrounding the birth of a child).
83 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992); see also id., at 852 (arguing that a pregnant woman’s “suffering
is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s
role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and culture.”); id. at 896-98
(invalidating spousal notice rule in part on the ground that it embodies “a common-law understanding
of a woman’s role within the family” that is no longer “consistent with our understanding of the
family, the individual, or the Constitution.”).  
84 Id. at 896-98.
depending on the government interest—fetal life or women’s health—claimed to be
at stake.80 
Invocation of precedent, however, is not a completely satisfying answer.
While the Court has never overruled Geduldig, it has since acknowledged the gender
equality concerns raised by measures targeting reproduction and abortion.81  In
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court argued that gender
differences in parental leave policies reflected “pervasive sex role stereotype[s]” that
justified invocation of heightened equal protection scrutiny.82  Even more pertinently,
Casey itself invoked women’s equality concerns in concluding that access to
abortion should continue to receive constitutional protection.  In marked contrast to
Geduldig’s casual dismissal of the relationship between reproduction and gender
equality, the Casey Court emphasized that “[t]he ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives.”83  The Court then returned to the gender
equal protection theme in invalidating Pennsylvania’s spousal notice requirement,
which it argued embodied “a view of marriage consonant with the common-law
status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage. . . .
Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry.”84
This is not to say that subsequent precedent is univocal, or that the Court has
to come to view regulations differentiating among the sexes because of their different
85 533 U.S. 53, 61–70 (2001).  In addition, in Bray v. Alexandria Health Clinic, the Court
relied on Geduldig to reject the claim that opposition to abortion represented invidious discrimination
against women because only women obtain abortions.  506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993).
86 See also Siegel, supra note ?, at 267–77 (noting that Court’s gender equal protection and
abortion jurisprudence share a physiological focus that hides the role played by stereotypes and other
social constructions of gender).
87 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (emphasizing that “no other procedure
involves the purposeful termination of potential life”); see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 73 (The difference
between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one.”); Michael M. v. Superior Ct.,
450 U.S. 464, 469–75 (1981) (upholding statutory rape law which punished only the male involved
justified by differences between “young men and young women . . . with respect to the problems and
the risks of sexual intercourse”).  For the claim that Nguyen’s diminished scrutiny rests more on the
immigration context then the real differences line of gender equal protection jurisprudence, see Nina
Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 Geo.
Immigr. L. J. 835 (2002).
88 For example, some post Casey decisions sustaining abortion health regulations
acknowledge that the regulations may be unnecessary and may even operate to undermine women’s
health, but find that this evidence is not sufficient to render the regulations irrational or demonstrate
illegitimate purpose.  See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 540–41, 546–47 (9th Cir.
2004); Women’s Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 419–21, 423 (5th Cir. 2001).
89 Moreover, the one exception, Mazurek v. Armstrong, is a per curiam decision that claimed
to simply apply established case law upholding physician-only requirements for abortion.  520 U.S.
968, 974–75 (1997).
roles in reproduction as unconstitutional.   On the contrary, in its recent Nguyen v.
INS decision, the Court invoked the biological reality that women are necessarily
present at birth to uphold greater limitations on the ability of unmarried male citizens
to pass U.S. citizenship to their children born abroad than apply to unmarried female
citizens.85  Yet at the same time, Nguyen could be read to support viewing abortion
regulations as sex-based classifications, for it demonstrates that much existing
abortion jurisprudence can fit within the gender equal protection rubric.86   In
particular, the biological reasoning of Nguyen supports sustaining many measures
that single out abortion for restrictions in the aim of preserving potential life as
simply reflecting “real differences” between the sexes.87  This move is more difficult
regarding abortion health regulations, given abortion’s ordinariness as a medical
procedure, as is demonstrating that health regulations are closely related to the
government’s acknowledged legitimate interest in women’s health.88  But even here
the conflict between gender equal protection and abortion jurisprudence is still fairly
minimal, as most Supreme Court decisions addressing health regulations predate
Casey and subject health regulations to more searching scrutiny.89
To be fair, another major factor contributing to the courts’ failure to discuss
gender equality concerns in the abortion context is the limited extent to which
advocates have raised such arguments.  Advocates initially attacked abortion
restrictions on substantive due process rather than equal protection grounds and
continued with that approach—perhaps not surprisingly, given their success in Roe
90 A variety of factors likely played into the choice of substantive due process as the means
for attacking abortion restrictions, including not just the greater development of this line of
jurisprudence compared to gender equal protection at the time but also advocates’ fears of
undermining the chances of enacting an Equal Rights Amendment.  See Law, supra note ?, at
985–987 & n. 115; MacKinnon, supra note ?, at 1288 n. 34; Reva Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality
Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin, eds., Mothers in
Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood 61 (1995).  Whether advocates erred
in challenging abortion on substantive due process and privacy grounds rather than equal protection
is a matter of some dispute among commentators.  Compare Allen, supra note ? (arguing that both
approaches have merit) and Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 788–91
(1989) (defending abortion under right to privacy, with privacy understood to mean protection against
states’ forcing women’s lives into a standardized mold), with Sunstein, supra note ?, 31–32 (arguing
against the substantive due process/privacy approach and in favor equal protection); Catherine
MacKinnon, (same); compare also Jack M. Balkin, ed., What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said 233–34,
244–47, 252 (2005) (offering different scholars’ views of whether Roe should and could have been
decided on gender equal protection grounds).
91 See Tucson Woman’s Clinic, Springfield Healthcare Center v. Nixon, No. 05-4296-CV-C-
NLL (W.D. Mo.), Complaint at ¶ 50, available at: http://www.crlp.org/pdf/pdf_crt.MO.Complaint.pdf;
Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, Complaint, supra note ?, at ¶ 66.  Gender equality claims have also
been included in challenges to minor notification statutes, alleging that the imposition of parental
notification requirements only on female minors violates equal protection.  See, e.g., Nova Health Sys.
v. Fogarty, Amended Complaint, 2001 WL 34782765 at ¶ 62a (June 22, 2001); Wicklund v. Lambert,
979 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Mont. 1997). 
92 In addition to Tucson Woman’s Clinic, gender equal protection claims were expressly
rejected by the district court in Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561, 567–68 (D. Mont. 1995),
although they were not discussed in the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court per curiam decisions in that
case.  See also Wicklund v. Lambert, 979 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Mont. 1997).  In addition, equal
protection claims have been asserted under state constitutions.  See New Mexico Right to
Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 850–57 (N.M. 1998); Linda J. Wharton, State Equal
Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex
Discrimination, 36 Rutgers L. J. 1201, 1248–54 (2005).
and the unfavorable precedent of Geduldig.90 Today, gender equality claims
increasingly are included as well, particularly in challenges to abortion health
regulations, but the focus remains largely on due process.91  Yet this factor fails to
explain Tucson Woman’s Clinic, where gender equal protection claims were pressed,
to no avail.92  It is also striking, given the Court’s sympathy to gender equality
concerns in regard to the spousal notification requirement of Casey, that courts
invalidating abortion health regulations on undue burden grounds (or as irrational
measures) have not similarly sought to buttress their conclusions by reference to
these concerns.
Perhaps courts would be more sympathetic if gender equality challenges to
abortion health regulations were asserted and developed more extensively,
particularly if advocates clarified the extent to which such claims are consistent with
the Supreme Court’s decisions.  I am skeptical, however, that even more sustained
efforts to assert gender equal protection challenges would prove that successful.
Instead, I believe an additional force is at work here, one that is rooted in
administrative law and the broad regulatory powers of the modern administrative
state.  Framing abortion regulations as solely health regulations, unrelated to state’s
93 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
94 See Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 546 n.2 Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d
at 174; Women’s Med. Ctr., 248 F.3d at 419 & n.20; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 884–85 (invoking
Lee Optical in holding that physician-counseling requirement did not create an undue burden);
Friendship Med. Ctr., 505 F.2d at 1149–50 (early post-Roe decision stating that targeted abortion
regulations might well satisfy Lee Optical, but measures targeting fundamental rights such as access
to abortion trigger stricter scrutiny).
95 The established mantra is that courts will review classifications in economic and social
legislation deferentially unless a suspect category or fundamental constitutional right is involved.  See
FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976).
interest in preserving fetal life, leads courts to view these measures as simply one
species of economic and social legislation.   Viewed in those terms, the courts’
stance becomes one of tremendous deference.   In the words of the Supreme Court’s
famously lenient standard of Williamson v. Lee Optical:
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies.  Or so the legislature may
think.  Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to
the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind.  The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a
remedy there, neglecting the others.93
It is no surprise that courts, in rejecting equal protection challenges to TRAP
regulations, have invoked Lee Optical and the government’s broad power to regulate
in the name of health.94  From Lee Optical’s one-step-at-a-time perspective, targeting
abortion for special regulation appears perfectly legitimate, and the burden of
persuasion is on those who claim it is suspect. 
This creates a paradox.  Framing these abortion measures as health
regulations is necessary to highlight their gender discriminatory aspect and remove
the fetal life rationale for treating abortion as unique.  Doing so, however, creates a
separate analytic obstacle to challenging measures that single out for abortion for
regulation.  Of course, the Court deviates from Lee Optical’s deferential stance when
it perceives gender discrimination afoot,95 but stressing the health aspect of abortion
regulations tends to erase their gender discriminatory character.  Under this framing,
abortion’s status as a medical procedure rises to the fore, rather than the reality that
it is a medical procedure undergone only by women.   Moreover, as a practical
matter, health regulations frequently operate one step removed from women
obtaining abortions, again serving to hide their gendered character.  Other than
informed consent requirements justified on grounds of women’s psychological
health, it is abortion providers who are directly affected by TRAP laws; the
restrictive impact on women occurs indirectly as the result of pass-though costs.
Similarly, while the net effect was to deny women easier access to emergency
96 See GAO Report, supra note ?, at Appendix II (non-approvable letter to Barr Research on
Plan B OTC switch application, May 6, 2004) .
97 505 U.S. at 878. 
98 Id.  Whether unnecessary health regulations are constitutionally prohibited even if they do
not create a substantial obstacle to abortion access was an issue left unresolved in Casey.  Although
the Casey joint opinion’s phrasing suggests that such unnecessary abortion regulations could be
constitutional, it never says so expressly or overrules those parts of prior decisions that had invalidated
health regulations found to be unnecessary as well as burdensome.   See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 438 (1983); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 920–21 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (arguing that abortion restrictions that are
irrational or unnecessary are also undue); compare Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 539 (inferring
from Mazurek and Casey that regulations that are at least facially connected to women’s health are
not unconstitutional because objectively unnecessary, but may be unconstitutional if they impose an
undue burden), with Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d 157, 197 (4th Cir. ) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting) (“Casey and its predecessors teach us that health regulations which are unnecessary, i.e.,
not reasonably related to maternal health or which depart from accepted medical practice, cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny”).  As the Ninth Circuit in Tucson Woman’s Clinic implicitly
recognized, this is not really a debate over whether unnecessary health regulations are constitutional;
if regulations are acknowledged to bear no relationship to women’s health, they would be irrational
and unconstitutional on that ground, without reference to their relationship to abortion.  Instead, the
real question is whether courts defer to the government’s determination that a regulation serves a
legitimate interest in preserving women’s health, or instead subject such claims to independent factual
scrutiny.  
99 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (per curiam).
100 Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 567–68 (9th Cir. 1996).
contraception, the FDA’s action regarding Plan B took the form of denial of an OTC
application submitted by Barr Labs.96 
This framing of abortion regulations as ordinary health measures is evident
in Casey.  In laying out its analytic approach to abortion health regulations, the Court
began by stating, “[a]s with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations
to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion.”97  On this account,
constitutional protections for abortion operate merely as an outer limit, precluding
only “unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a
substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.”98  The decision that best
illustrates the immunizing power of the health perspective, however, is Mazurek v.
Armstrong.99  Mazurek involved a challenge to Montana’s adoption of a physician-
only requirement for performance of abortions.   The Ninth Circuit had reversed the
district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, concluding that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated sufficient possibility of success on their claim that the law was
animated by the unconstitutional purpose of creating a substantial obstacle to
abortion to merit that the district court reconsider the balance of hardships.100 The
Ninth Circuit was in turn reversed—summarily—by the Supreme Court.  According
to the Court, “even assuming . . . that a legislative purpose to interfere with the
constitutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that
101 520 U.S. at 972–75.
102 Id. at 972.  Courts have read Mazurek as at least putting high evidentiary burdens on
illegitimate purpose claims.  See Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 493 (7th Cir. 1999) (Casey and
Mazurek suggest that a purpose challenge “will rarely be successful, absent some sort of explicit
indication from the state that it was acting in furtherance of an improper purpose.”); see also Tucson
Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 540–41, 546–47 (citing Mazurek and rejecting evidence supporting
inference of improper motive where “scheme as a whole is a typical set of health and safety standards,
unusual primarily because it singles out abortion clinics,” and death of a patient at an abortion clinic
preceded adoption).  The Court’s recent decision in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood may revive inquiry
into the purpose underlying enactment of abortion restrictions, albeit under the aegis of an examination
of severability.  See 126 S. Ct. 961, 968–69 (2006); Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion
Rights With Renewed “Purpose,” 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2552, 2566–73 (2006).
103 Id. at 973 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 885).
104 Id. at 973–74.
105 See, e.g., Women’s Medical Professional Corp. v. Baird, 277 F.Supp.2d 862, 871 n.1 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (noting that written transfer agreement at tissue there was promulgated administratively
rather than legislatively but noting this fact was “of little consequence” to its decision); see also
Founder’s Women’s Health Ctr. v. Ohio State Dept’t of Health, Nos. 01AP-872, 01AP-873, 2002 WL
1933886 at *5, *7–*10 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2002) (state court action invoking deferential
standards for reviewing administrative agencies factual findings and interpretation of legislative
scheme and upholding hearing examiner’s conclusion that abortion providers are subject to statutory
right . . . could render the Montana law invalid,” the physician-only requirement was
clearly constitutional under Casey and other of its precedents.101  
Mazurek is notable on many fronts; the Court’s reaching out to take the case
at such an early stage being one, and its dicta attempting to do away with the purpose
prong of the undue burden test being another.102  For my purposes here, what is
particularly striking about Mazurek is the Court’s emphasis on the states’ “‘broad
latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed
professionals.”103  That latitude so immunized Montana’s physician-only requirement
from claims of impermissible purpose that the lack of a health basis for the
requirement, as well as evidence of illegitimate motives underlying its adoption,
became irrelevant.104  Against this strong presumption of legitimacy, claims that
health regulations targeting abortion constitute gender discrimination—whether
facially or based on invidious intent—seem destined to fail.
B. Gender Equal Protection and the Administrative Dimension
So far, this discussion focuses on the health aspect of these abortion
regulations, rather than their status as (at least in part) administrative agency
promulgations.  Indeed, it is striking how rarely decisions refer to the agency-
promulgated character of abortion health regulations.  This absence reflects the fact
that the vast majority of decisions involve constitutional challenges brought in
federal court, where the governing standards are the same regardless of the
legislative of administrative nature of the measure at issue.105   In addition, most
licensure requirements).
106  In the drug regulation context, for example, courts are extremely deferential to the FDA’s
scientific judgments.  See Noah, supra note ?, at 592–93; see also Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616,
620–21 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting, in rejecting challenge to FDA labeling decision on oral contraceptives,
that “[t]he FDA possesses the requisite know-how to conduct such analyses [of existing body of
scientific research], by sifting through the scientific evidence to determine the most accurate and up-
to-date information regarding a particular drug, and how those data affect human usage”).
107 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. l. Rev.
1189, 1269 (1986); see also id. at 1262–72 (describing historical emergence of deferential
administrative review in the aftermath of the Court’s acceptance of broad regulatory power). 
108 Cf. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121, 1200–02 (2000) (arguing that pattern and
practice lawsuits are harder to bring in contexts of discretionary individual decisionmaking and easier
to bring where governing standards are specified in governing rules).
administrative abortion measures originate in legislation that itself targets abortion
for regulation, a dynamic that operates to obscure—or at least downplay—the agency
role.
As a result, discerning an administrative effect in health regulation challenges
is based largely on conjecture.  Nonetheless, it seems plausible to think that the
administrative aspect of these regulations may operate to reinforce the Lee Optical
paradigm.   Adequate facility size and equipment, training and qualification
requirements, likelihood of harmful health consequences or improper use of
medication—these are the sort of questions typically seen as matters for
administrative agency expertise.  Regulations and decisions addressing these matters
thus come with a presumption of deference rooted in administrative law, for which
Lee Optical may operate as a proxy.106  This reinforcing dynamic is hardly unique
to the context of abortion health regulations.  On the contrary, Lee Optical and
doctrines of administrative deference stand in a symbiotic relationship with one
another.  Modern deference to administrative decisionmaking would be indefensible
without acceptance of the government’s broad power over economic and social
legislation; nor would this power amount to much if the government could not
delegate much of the substance of regulation to administrative agencies without
losing the benefit of deferential review.107
Similarly, the administrative backdrop of these abortion measures serves to
further erase their sex-based nature.   Administrative regulation can take the form of
promulgation of rules targeted at abortion providers, in response to abortion-specific
legislative measures.  It also occurs on a case-by-case basis, however, as a result of
application of a general statutory and regulatory scheme.  The FDA’s encounters
with RU-486 and Plan B are the prime instances here, but case-by-case regulation
can also occur at the state and local level; for example, in the issuance or revocation
of licenses and exemptions.  Such a case-by-case posture can make identifying
dissimilar treatment more difficult.108  
At the same time, the case-by-case posture limits the ability to prove that
administrative decisions restricting access to abortion will prove onerous or are
109 438 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2006).
110 See Baird, 438 F.3d at 599.  On remand, the clinic is seeking a TRO to prevent the health
department from disclosing the names of physicians who have agreed, if they can remain anonymous,
to provide back-up care in support of the clinic’s application for a waiver.  See Pltfs’ Motion on
Remand, Women’s Med. Prof. Corp. v. Baird, 2006 WL 1111922 (Mar. 20, 2006).
111 See Baird, 438 F.3d at 605–09; see also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 973–74
(1997) (per curiam) (similarly arguing that claim of unconstitutional purpose “is positively
contradicted by the fact that only a dingle practitioner is affected”).
112 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–33 (1985); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (emphasizing that choice of whether to proceed by general rules or case-by-
case discretion “lies in the first instance within the [agency’s] discretion” and that where factual
differences exist, an agency “has reason to proceed with caution, developing its standards in a
case-by-case manner.”).  
animated by invidious motives.  This point is illustrated by the Sixth Circuit’s recent
decision in Women’s Medical Professional Corporation v. Baird, upholding
application the requirement that surgical facilities have written transfer agreements
with hospitals to a clinic owned by a prominent abortion provider.109  Bowing to
public pressure as well as internal opposition by members of their boards of
directors, local hospitals refused to enter such an agreement with the clinic.  Thus,
application of the written transfer requirement meant the clinic—the only clinic in
a fifty mile radius, and the only clinic in all of southern Ohio that provides late
second-term abortions—would have to close.110  Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit
denied that application of the requirement created an undue burden on abortion
access.  In so holding, it emphasized that only one clinic was affected and that the
director of the state’s health department had granted waivers of license requirements
for other abortion clinics in Ohio, the latter fact serving in the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis to defeat the claim that the director was motivated by an unconstitutional
purpose of limiting access to abortion.111 
Concerns about not intruding on administrative expertise also may make
courts resistant to perceiving regulatory measures as illegitimate even if targeting of
abortion is acknowledged.  Administrative agencies regulate in targeted ways all the
time, issuing rules designed for a particular activity or substance while leaving other
activities or substances unregulated, or setting policy through adjudication that may
govern only a narrow range of factually indistinguishable cases.  As a general matter,
administrative law grants agencies great deference in these regulatory choices, on the
ground that the inherent policy and resource implications of such decisions are more
appropriate for agency control.112  Viewing administrative tailoring as potentially
suspect, rather than as an appropriate exercise of substantive knowledge, is thus at
odds with the basic presuppositions of administrative law.   True, regulations that
facially target suspect classifications are not shielded from enhanced scrutiny by
their administrative character.  But fears of intruding unduly on a broad range of
agency decisionmaking seems likely to make courts resistant to the argument that
targeting a procedure or drug used solely by one sex is for that reason a sex-based
classification warranting greater justification.  For example, on that logic enhanced
113 See Roni Rabin, Breast Feed Or Else, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2006, at F1.
114  See supra note ?.
115 See cases cited supra in note ?; see also San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 16–17 (1973) (noting that legislation found to interfere with fundamental constitutional rights
is subject to strict scrutiny).
116 See Tucson Woman’s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 544–45; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702,, 755 n.3 (1997)(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting, in rejecting substantive due process
arguments for a right to assisted suicide, that “the Equal Protection Clause . . . does essentially nothing
in a case like this that the Due Process Clause cannot do on its own”); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea
of Equality, 95 Harv. l. Rev. 537, 551 (1982) (same).
117 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 431, 438 (1983); see also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that the state’s interest in “the preservation and
protection of maternal health” becomes compelling, at the end of the first trimester and therefore states
could “regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates” to this
interest) (emphasis added); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192–96 (1973) (invalidating requirement that
first trimester abortions be performed only in accredited hospitals as not reasonably related to health
concern); Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349, 1351–52 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating St. Louis measure
targeting abortion, concluding that it was not “legitimately related to the recognized objectives of state
regulation” and penalized women seeking abortion and their physicians).
scrutiny is as warranted of FDA decisions affecting uterine or prostate cancer drugs,
or of Health and Human Services’ program to encourage maternal breastfeeding,113
as of decisions affecting abortion.
C. Equal Protection and Abortion
In my view, these doctrines of deference mean that gender equal protection
is unlikely to prove a fruitful avenue for challenging administrative regulations of
abortion.  Indeed, the same is true of other types of equal protection challenges.  In
the past, courts frequently invalidated abortion health regulations under the
fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis,114 under which measures
singling out protected rights for regulation ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny.115   But
Casey’s articulation of the undue burden standard undermines this approach.  The
claim that the abortion right receives greater constitutional protection under equal
protection than under due process is implausible, all the more so given that the
reason for according this right heightened equal protection scrutiny in the first place
is its privileged status under due process.   Hence, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion
that, in the case of abortion, fundamental rights equal protection scrutiny collapses
into undue burden analysis appears correct.116
Nor does invalidation of abortion health regulations under some form of
heightened rationality review seem a probable scenario.  To be sure, some support
for such an approach exists, in abortion precedent invalidating second trimester
hospitalization requirements found to “depart from accepted medical practice” or be
“unnecessary.”117  By describing such regulations as unreasonable, the Court signaled
that rationality review in the abortion context should take a more searching guise
118 Compare Akron, 462 U.S. at 438–39 (“It is true that a state abortion regulation is not
unconstitutional simply because it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the asserted state
interest. But the lines drawn in a state regulation must be reasonable, and this cannot be said” of
Akron’s second-trimester hospitalization requirement” because “evidence [demonstrated] that—at
least during the early weeks of the second trimester—D & E abortions may be performed as safely in
an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital”) and Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 511, 516–17 (although
state has “legitimate interest in regulating second-trimester abortions,” “its discretion does not permit
it to adopt regulations that depart from accepted medical practice”) with Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases.  But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages
of the new requirement. . . . It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
119 This is not to say that under Casey second-trimester hospitalization requirements are
constitutional.  On the contrary, such requirements may well constitute undue burdens on access to
previability abortions, given the extreme and easily calculable increase in costs they impose.  Planned
Parenthood v. Janklow, 216 F. Supp.2d 983, 992–93 (D. S.D. 2002) (holding South Dakota second-
trimester hospitalization requirement unconstitutional as creating an undue burden and concluding
Akron still valid on such requirements’ unconstitutionality), rev’d on other grounds, Planned
Parenthood v. Rounds, 372 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2004); Jackson Women’s Health Org’n Inc. v. Amy,
330 F. Supp.2d 820 (S.D. Miss. 2004)(preliminarily enjoining requirement that second-trimester
abortions be performed only in licensed surgical facilities or hospitals); Reproductive Servs. v.
Keating, 35 F.Supp.2d 1332 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (preliminarily enjoining second trimester requirement
for abortions); contra Davis v. Feiker, 952 P.2d 505, 515–16 (Okla. 1998) (concluding Akron no
longer retains its validity post-Casey and holding evidence failed to establish that second-trimester
hospitalization requirement creates an undue burden).
120 See supra note ?.  On the other hand, while decision such as Akron and Simopolous predate
Casey, they have not been overruled; moreover, their emphasis on medical practice has continued in
other abortion contexts, most notably in rejection of partial-birth abortion bans and insistence on good
faith health exceptions to abortion restrictions.  See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930–38 (2000);
see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967 (2006).
than it ordinarily assumes.118  Again, however, this methodological precedent appears
at least somewhat dubious post-Casey.119  The signal conveyed by Mazurek is that
states should be given leeway in regulating abortion unless their efforts significantly
impede women’s access to abortion.120  Enhanced rationality review is also at odds
with the doctrines of deference discussed above, and for the same reasons seems
unlikely to emerge as abortion regulation becomes more administrative. 
Equal protection thus is unlikely to offer advocates a way around the
limitations of current protections against under due process.  This does not mean that
equality concerns, and particularly gender equality concerns, can play no role in the
abortion context.  But it suggests that if equality concerns gain judicial traction here,
it will be through being integrated into the undue burden standard, as occurred in
Casey itself, rather than through independent equal protection challenges.  This
conclusion seems only stronger outside of the health context, where biological
realities of reproduction confound efforts to demonstrate the gender discriminatory
aspect of abortion restrictions.
Put differently, I am doubtful that advocates can avoid engaging with the
undue burden standard and abortion’s constitutional uniqueness.  The challenge lies
in encouraging courts to expand their understanding of the ways abortion is unique,
121 See, e.g., Baird, 438 F.3d at 602–09; Greenville Women’s Clinic, 222 F.3d at 163–72.
But see Planned Parenthood v. Atchinson, 126 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding
illegitimate purpose where medical offices structured similarly to abortion clinic where not similarly
required to obtain a certificate of need).
122 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42--
43 & n.9 (1983).
123 See supra text accompanying note ?.
in ways that better reflect the realities of women’s lives and abortion regulation.
Abortion is unique not just in what it represents for potential life, but also in its
relationship to women’s equality—and, of particular relevance to administrative
abortion measures, in the danger that opposition to abortion rather than legitimate
health concerns lead it to be singled out for regulation.  In short, advocates need to
convince courts that abortion’s uniqueness does not necessarily justify abortion-
specific regulation, but on the contrary may necessitate subjecting some abortion-
specific measures to greater scrutiny.  Mazurek stands as a significant obstacle to
such arguments, however, and the reality at present is that the undue burden standard
offers limited protection against unnecessarily onerous abortion health regulations.121
III.  ABORTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In sum, constitutional law seems unlikely—at least in the short run—to offer
much protection against unwarranted health regulations and increasing
administrative restrictions of abortion.  A potential alternative exists, however, for
trying to redress the lack of fit between many such regulations and the government’s
health interest.  That alternative is ordinary administrative law.
Significantly, the Court has rejected the claim that Lee Optical and
deferential constitutional rationality review should govern in the federal
administrative law context.  While insisting that “a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency,” the Court nonetheless has imposed potentially
substantial requirements of relevancy and explanation on federal agencies: 
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made. . . . Normally, an
agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.122
As noted above, broad legislative regulatory authority entails—at least in
practice—deference to administrative decisions.123  Thus, administrative law’s
imposition of such close scrutiny stands in some tension with constitutional law’s
124 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial
Review and Nuclear Waste in Administrative Law Stories 143–49,160–65 (Peter L. Strauss, ed. 2005)
(discussing development of hard look review); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Accountability in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461,
467  (2003)(arguing that “efforts at preventing arbitrariness mainly have been taking place under the
rubric of ‘ordinary’ administrative law rather than ‘constitutional’ administrative law”); American
Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing between assessing
constitutionality of delegation and whether in exercising delegated powers agency acted arbitrarily
or capriciously).
125 Compare State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46–57 (subjecting National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s decision to rescind passive restraint requirement to searching scrutiny) with
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co v. NRC, 462 U.S. 87, 98–105 1983) (deferring to NRC’s determination that
uncertainties concerning long-term storage of nuclear waste need not be considered in assessing
environmental effects of proposed nuclear plants).  While the discussion here focuses on judicial
review of agency factfinding and reasoning, similar variation exists in judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations.   See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443 (2005).
126 See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 35, 366-79 (1998)
(engaging in close scrutiny of factual record and reversing NLRB determination in formal adjudication
that successor employer lacked a good faith reasonable doubt as to continued union support, criticizing
the agency for not adhering to its stated standards and thereby foregoing reasoned decisionmaking);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (undertaking “thorough,
probing, in-depth review” of informal adjudicatory decision by Secretary of Transportation).
127  For example, although only expressly raised in the partial concurrence, the more
searching scrutiny employed in State Farm was at least in part a result of the political backdrop of the
passive restraint rule’s recision, specifically a new Presidential administration with stated opposition
to heavy regulation of U.S. car manufacturers.  See 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of
Bureaucracy 63–65 (1990).  The Court more recently emphasized that while politics is a legitimate
consideration, agencies must nonetheless explain their changes in approach.  See National Cable &
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699–2700 (2005); see also FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–61 (2000) (rejecting FDA’s assertion of
reliance on the Lee Optical model.  At the same time, however, close scrutiny under
the administrative law rubric also reflects constitutional law’s deference to legislative
regulatory choices, both as to the substance of economic and social legislation and
as to the decision to delegate substantial decisionmaking to administrative agencies.
In light of this deference, the courts have used subconstitutional doctrines of
administrative law as a means to check arbitrary governmental action.124
Not surprisingly, given these conflicting demands of deference and scrutiny,
in practice the intensity of judicial review of federal agency action has varied.125  The
net result is that federal courts generally defer, but sometimes undertake a more
potent “hard look” review of agency decisionmaking.  Such hard look scrutiny is
most common in regard to notice and comment or informal rulemaking, but also
occurs in adjudicatory contexts, even in regard to informal decisions over which
agencies enjoy substantial discretion.126  Often what triggers greater scrutiny is
judicial perceptions of perceived agency arbitrariness, expansion of power, or
improper influences.127 
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco under the FDCA and emphasizing broad expansion in FDA’s
regulatory authority that would result as grounds for not deferring to agency’s construction of the
statute).
128 See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) (“[T]he
consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.”); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (stating
agencies must provide “a reasoned analysis” for changing rules); see also Michael Asimow, The Scope
of Judicial Review of Decisions of California’s Administrative Agencies, 42 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1157,
1232 (1995) (“One important factor in establishing an abuse of discretion is an apparent inconsistency
of the agency decision with its prior decisions.”).
129 Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 66 F.Supp.2d 691, 705 (D. S. Car. 1999), rev’d on
appeal, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
130 Id. at 706–10.
The lack of fit between administrative abortion regulations and the
government’s health interests is the type of discrepancy that potentially may provoke
greater judicial review.   In administrative law terms, this lack of fit suggests a lack
of reasoned decisionmaking.   Inconsistent agency actions in addressing abortion or
reproduction issues similarly may trigger greater judicial scrutiny.128  Such
inconsistency not only raises the impression of arbitrary administrative action, it also
suggests that the agency’s stated rationale is not what is actually motivating its
actions. 
Consider in this regard the example of South Carolina’s TRAP regulations:
The district court in Greenville Women’s Clinic found that officials at the state’s
Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), which promulgated the
regulations, “took no meaningful steps to ensure that” the regulations would further
the state’s interest in the health of women obtaining first trimester abortions.129
Instead, the driving force behind the regulations appears to have been administrative
standardization, with officials essentially applying regulations applicable to second
trimester abortions and other healthcare facilities to first trimester abortion providers.
However, DHEC officials made no effort to determine if parts of the resulting
regulations were medically appropriate for first trimester abortions and sought only
limited input on the regulations as a whole from medical professionals.130  Taking
these findings as accurate, at the federal level such failure to seek evidence on the
medical realities of first-trimester abortions and tailor regulations to fit the health
risks actually presented would probably result in the regulations being vacated and
remanded.  
In the case of the FDA’s refusal to approve Plan B for OTC status, the
numerous ways in which the agency deviated from its standard practices are likely
to provoke more searching examination than a refusal to grant OTC status might
otherwise receive.  Thus, while the agency’s conclusion that usage studies for older
teenagers and adults are not extrapolatable to younger teens is the type of scientific
issue on which courts will ordinarily defer, the fact that the FDA has not questioned
such extrapolations in the past puts on it here a greater onus of explanation and
justification.  Evidence that high level FDA officials solicited support for their
131 See GAO Report, supra note ?, Appendix III at 44-46 (providing timeline of internal FDA
actions on the Plan B OTC switch application); id., Appendix V at 52 (memorandum from Office of
New Drugs Director noting moral concerns regarding adolescent sexual activity and parental control
raised by the Plan B OTC switch application); see also 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (providing that the
FDA Commissioner shall exempt any drug from prescription requirements upon finding that “such
requirements are not necessary for protection of the public health” and is “safe and effective for use
in self-medication”); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 645–46
(1990)(emphasizing that the organic statute under which an agency acts determines the relevant factors
it must and can consider and noting that an agency may be “ill-equipped” to take into account policy
concerns outside its field of expertise).
132 See Tummino v. von Eschenbach, CV 05-366, Decision and Order at 10, 32–33 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 24, 2006) (Pohorelsky, M.J.) (recounting statement and other evidence suggesting that “the
agency’s senior decisionmakers were resting on improper concerns about the morality of adolescent
sexual activity”).
133 See id., at 6–14, 16–19, 23–24.
concerns about younger teenagers after having decided to deny the OTC switch
application, rather than seeking to determine if these concerns were merited
beforehand, may reinforce judicial concerns.  Such after-the-fact justifications
reinforce the suspicion that the FDA’s decision was driven more by moral opposition
to teenage sex and politics than by the public health concerns that constitute the
agency’s statutory mandate.131 On that score, documents recounting that the FDA’s
Deputy Commissioner voiced fears that adolescents might “form sex-based cults
centered around the use of Plan B” are hardly reassuring.132
The Plan B saga also demonstrates the importance of administrative
constraints  outside of judicial review.  One remarkable feature of the FDA’s handing
of Plan B is the extent to which the professional staff of the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research (CDER), the arm of FDA that reviews OTC switch
applications, opposed the decision to issue a nonapprovable letter.  In official
memoranda, emails, and meetings, the CDER staff made clear their disagreement
with the FDA’s decision and their concern that the decision was illegitimately based
on opposition to teenage sex; these concerns even led one CDER director and an
FDA advisory committee member to resign from the FDA.133  Moreover, the FDA’s
standard procedures for delegating decisions on OTC switch applications to its
professional staff provided numerous opportunities for that staff to address high level
officials’ concerns and seek to change their minds.  Thus, in a certain light the FDA’s
handling of Plan B offers reaffirmation of administrative law’s emphasis on agency
expertise as a potent check on administrative arbitrariness.  True, the constraining
forces of professionalism and agency structure ultimately did not prevent the FDA
from issuing a nonapproval letter.  But even here these forces have fostered
administrative accountability, playing a significant role in making public the FDA’s
unusual treatment of Plan B. 
One important consequence of an administrative law approach is that
challenges to state agency actions addressing abortion will be brought under state
134 Although state courts are the more common forum for state administrative review, federal
courts can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims involving review of agency action.
See City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 167–73 (1997).
135 For a comprehensive if somewhat dated overview of state administrative law, see William
A. McGrath, Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 571 (1991);
see also Arthur E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 297
(1986) (discussing the twinned evolution of state and federal administrative law and core concepts
common to both).
136 See Michael Asimow et al., State and Federal Administrative Law (2d ed. 1998)  § 9.08,
at 602, 608-09; see also McGrath, Project, supra note ?, at 777–87  (describing state court review of
agency policy decisions).
137 See Fla. Stat. Ann.  120.542 (1); Jim Rossi, The Revised Florida Administrative Procedure
Act: A Rulemaking Revolution or Counter-Revolution, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 345,353–58 (1997)
(discussing Florida’s waiver provision).
138 See James E. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge:
Central Panels and their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 Admin.
L. Rev. 1355, 1356–61 (2002).  No such central ALJ division exists at the federal level, but federal
ALJs have similar independence protections.  The bigger contrast concerns agency review of ALJ
decisions:  under the federal Administrative Procedure Act agencies can review ALJ determinations
de novo, although the ALJ decision becomes part of the record.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 557(b)(c); see also
Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1950) (emphasizing that ALJ decision is part of the record
and that ALJ credibility determinations may be entitled to particular weight in assessing whether an
agency decision is supported by substantial evidence).
law and usually in state court.134   Although the substance of state and federal
administrative law is generally quite similar, the procedures by which state
administrative action is challenged vary from state to state, as do some of the
governing standards of judicial review.135  Of particular relevance here, state courts
are in some ways more deferential in their review of agency action; for example,
hard look review of rulemaking and discretionary decisions is less common, although
some states are moving towards more greater scrutiny.136  On the other hand, some
states’ laws include features that are absent from federal law and that could prove
useful to advocates, such as Florida’s statutory requirement that agencies grant
waivers from governing rules in certain contexts.137  In addition, states increasingly
are moving to central panel systems for Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), under
which ALJs are not located within the agency whose decisions they review; in
conjunction with this development, some states are also restricting agency review of
ALJ decisions.138  The net effect of these changes is to make state ALJs less subject
to agency influence, a potentially significant insulation when ALJs are reviewing
politically contentious licensing decisions affecting abortion providers. 
It is important not to oversell the potential of administrative law as a
constraint on abortion restrictions.  While offering a basis for searching scrutiny,
administrative law also puts strong emphasis on deferring to agency expertise and
policy choices, an emphasis reflected (among other ways) in ostensibly deferential
139 See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 159–161 (1999) (discussing greater deference
courts give to agency determinations than to lower court determinations, as evident in standards of
review, and identifying agency expertise as one basis for the difference); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44, 864–66 (1984) (emphasizing importance of judicial deference to
agency policy choices in articulating deferential standard for review of agency interpretations of
statutes for which agency has implementation responsibility).
140 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-187 (1991) (upholding federal regulations
prohibiting recipients of funds under Title X of the federal Public Health Service Act from engaging
in abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning).
141 See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 725–29, 738-39 & n. 147 (1995) (arguing that the elective status of state
judges may lead to decisions compromising individual rights, and identifying instances when abortion
decisions factored into judicial elections); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1108,
1127–28 (1977) (arguing state judges’ elective status affects their decisions in controversial cases);
see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional
Design, 53 Admin. l. Rev. 551, 568 (2001) [hereinafter Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism]
(emphasizing that the ALJ central panel system helps limit the importance of elected state judges in
regulatory matters).
142 In addition, some claims currently brought against state abortion regulations resonate
particularly well with administrative law, especially attacks on regulations as improperly delegating
standard-setting power to private (or, at least, non-publicly accountable) entities when they require
abortion clinics to have a staff physician with hospital admitting privileges or a written transfer
agreement with a hospital.  Delegation and the problems it poses lie at the heart of administrative law.
Moreover, many states have more potent constraints on delegations, and in particular on private
delegations, than exist in federal law.   See, e.g., Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v.
Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 456–59 (Tex. 1997); Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism, supra note ?, at
560–62; McGrath, Project, supra note ?, at 579–93, 600-02.
standards of review.139  Abortion is an issue of perhaps unrivaled political
contestation, and courts therefore may well perceive abortion regulation as an area
where agency policy choices should be given freer rein—abortion’s uniqueness again
coming to the fore.  After all, one of the Court’s strongest endorsements of agency
change in position in response to politics came in a case involving abortion
regulations.140  The politics of abortion may prove even more important in state
courts, where judges are often elected and decisions favoring abortion providers may
rally anti-abortion groups to oppose a judge’s reelection.141  Nor does focusing on
administrative law come without costs; abortion rights advocates may find it easier
to bring constitutional challenges in federal court than to pursue unfamiliar state law
claims in state court venues.
Yet pursuing standard administrative law challenges has an appeal.  It takes
seriously the claim that abortion regulation is simply ordinary administrative
regulation, and pursues this claim to its logical conclusion: abortion regulation then
should be subject to the same constraints applicable to other less publicly contentious
instances of administrative decisionmaking.142  It also has the advantage of involving
a set of standards and requirements that are not abortion-specific, and thus not
subject to evisceration with waning judicial support for constitutional protection of
abortion.  Administrative law also offers advocates a variety of procedural
143 Administrative challenges may also offer remedial advantages.  In particular, in finding
that a rule is arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by the record in some regard, a court generally
declares the rule void in toto; by contrast, in its latest abortion decision the Court instructed lower
courts to engage in severability analysis when they find part of an abortion regulation unconstitutional.
See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006); Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea:
Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 Duke L. J. 291, 294 (2003).
 On the other hand, concern about the regulatory gaps created by such judicial invalidations of agency
rules has led to an increase in use of the remedy of remand without vacatur, under which that the
regulation remains in effect (if not actively enforced) while the agency rectifies its errors.   See Levin,
supra, at 295–96 ; see also Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New
Judicial Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 278 (2005) (analyzing
application of remand without vacatur within the D.C. Circuit). 
144 This is not only because more abortion regulations are being administratively promulgated,
but also because the regulations themselves may lead to state administrative proceedings, such as
license hearings or enforcement actions, with which federal courts may be unwilling to interfere.  See
Younger v. Harris, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 325–33 (1943).   To date, arguments for
abstention in abortion challenges have been largely unsuccessful, but these challenges usually involve
claims that the statutes or regulations at issue are facially unconstitutional; where claims are brought
to the application of regulatory requirements in specific cases, courts seem more disposed to consider
abstention.  See, e.g.,  Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.1992); Women’s Community
Health Ctr v. Texas Health Facilities Comm’n, 685 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Planned
Parenthood v. Atchinson, 126 F.3d 1042, 1046–48 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting abstention in
challenge to application of state certificate of need requirement to proposed abortion clinic, but noting
that “argument in favor of abstention becomes much more persuasive” when state administrative
proceedings had commenced).  The courts’ general willingness to sustain abortion health regulations
against facial challenges suggests that providers unable to comply with regulatory requirements
increasingly may need to seek administrative relief and pursue as applied challenges if their requests
for relief are denied, raising the likelihood of abstention.  Moreover, even if federal courts do not
abstain, simply pursuing routes of administrative relief will entail greater involvement in agency
proceedings.
openings—internal agency proceedings such as notice and comment rulemaking or
agency adjudications, in addition to judicial review—by which to pursue relief.143
But in any event, whatever its advantages or disadvantages, expanding administrative
regulation of abortion seems likely to make administrative law an unavoidable aspect
of abortion litigation in the future.144
CONCLUSION
Administrative regulation is spreading and becoming a more constant aspect
of the abortion landscape.  Intuitively, this development might appear to provide an
opening for greater success with gender equal protection claims; such administrative
measures are overwhelmingly health focused, and widespread agreement regarding
the comparative safety of abortion as a medical procedure supports claiming that
such singling out of abortion is unjustified.  I have argued here that this appearance
is deceptive.  Leaving aside impediments of precedent, emphasizing the health focus
of  such regulation invokes the government’s broad discretion in health regulation,
and the administrative character of these measures reinforces the appropriateness of
deferential scrutiny.  Yet while constitutional law currently offers little protection
against singling out of abortion and resultant burdens on particular providers,
subconstitutional doctrines of administrative law may hold greater promise.
